The Constitutionality of Claiming Jail by Salamanca, Paul E.
University of Kentucky
UKnowledge
Law Faculty Scholarly Articles Law Faculty Publications
2017
The Constitutionality of Claiming Jail
Paul E. Salamanca
University of Kentucky College of Law, psalaman@uky.edu
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/law_facpub
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Faculty Publications at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Scholarly Articles by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Repository Citation
Salamanca, Paul E., "The Constitutionality of Claiming Jail" (2017). Law Faculty Scholarly Articles. 635.
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/law_facpub/635
 
 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CLAIMING JAIL 
 
Paul E. Salamanca* 
 
Most pari-mutuel horse races in the United States are 
claiming races.1 In such races, a track official stipulates a claim 
price, and any authorized person may buy any horse that runs in 
that race at that price.2 This device discourages owners from 
running overqualified horses, which tends to ensure competitive 
fields. Say, for example, an official set a price of $50,000 for a race. 
An owner who ran a $60,000 horse in that race would stand a fair 
chance of picking up a good part of the purse, but he or she would 
also run a high risk of losing the horse to a claim for only five-sixths 
of its value.3 Meanwhile, an owner who ran a $40,000 horse in that 
same race would probably avoid a claim, but would also stand 
relatively little chance of picking up much of the purse, thereby 
wasting one of the horse’s starts.4 Claiming races thus cause fields 
to converge in quality, which tends to ensure competitive races. In 
fact, claiming races have this effect even if people are unaware of 
how they work, simply because people will see competitive races.5 
If people believe races are competitive, they will bet more,6 which 
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
* Wendell H. Ford Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. I am 
grateful to Chris Bradley, Zack Bray, Chris Frost, Brian Frye, John Garen, Henry Knight, 
Ron Mitchell, Kathy Moore, Doug Richards, and Max Stearns for their comments on this 
article. I was co-counsel to Jerry Jamgotchian in his petition for a writ of certiorari in 
Jamgotchian v. Kentucky Horse Racing Commission, 488 S.W.3d 594 (Ky. 2014), cert. 
denied, 137 S.Ct. 493 (2016). 
1 Christopher D. Hall, Market Enforced Information Asymmetry: A Study of 
Claiming Races, 24 ECON. INQUIRY 271, 272 (1986). 
2 See id. As Hall notes, “[t]his is a simplification. In some races, there are two or 
more claim prices available to owners ….”); id. n.3. 
3 See J. Shannon Neibergs & Patrick L. Vinzant, Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
of Racehorse Earnings and Profitability, 17 J. AGRIBUSINESS 37, 41 (1999) (“[A] higher 
class horse running in a lower class race has a high probability of being claimed at a lower 
[claiming price] than its potential; thus, the owner sacrifices terminal value and potential 
future purse earnings.”); Hall, supra note 1, at 274 (“[W]hen the track offers sufficiently 
large prizes, owners willingly enter horses worth more than the claim price. In anticipation 
of finding bargain horses, claimers collect information on horse prices and qualities.”). 
4 Id. at 39-41 (footnote omitted) (“Because of the very low probability of winning [a 
purse] and [having a horse claimed], while sacrificing [a start], a horse is not raced at a 
higher class than its ability.”). 
5 Jamgotchian v. Kentucky Horse Racing Commission, 488 S.W.3d 594, 613 (Ky. 
2014) (“The hope, reasonably borne out by centuries of experience, is that, generally at least, 
the claiming rule will result in transparent, competitive races.”). 
6 Neibergs & Vinzant, supra note 3, at 38 n.2 (“The more even the field, the less 
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will generate more revenue for the track. Moreover, to the extent 
people do understand how claiming races work, they will be even 
more inclined to see them as competitive, because they will 
understand how the potential for claims monitors entries.7 
From the perspective of many owners and claimants, 
however, a claiming race is merely a sale with low transaction 
costs, along with a chance for an owner to pick up part of a purse. 
Most importantly, the price is preset. Second, claimants do not 
have to travel from farm to farm to inspect horses. Instead, the 
horses are brought to the track, and even paraded before the 
race, allowing a brief inspection. Finally, claims are essentially 
“as is” transactions, with few grounds for rescission.8 From this 
perspective, claiming races present an opportunity to augment—
or reduce—one’s stable with the minimum of effort.9 
This aspect of claiming races—a sale with low transaction 
costs—would be especially significant, from a commercial point of 
view, if horses were predictably worth more in one place than 
another. This phenomenon would largely arise if purses were 
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
variation in wagering odds between the horses most likely and least likely to win the race. 
An even field improves parimutuel wagering, because one horse will not dominate wagering 
patterns and the race results.”). 
7 See Hall, supra note 1, at 273 (“[Experts] advertise the honesty of races to bettors 
by claiming horses. The elegance of the system lies in its ability to reveal information 
obtained by experts whether or not they act on it directly.”). Hall also argues that the 
absence of claims can signal fraud, which will attract the track’s attention. Assume, for 
example, that a $50,000 claiming race with a field of eight typically yields two claims, often 
for the same horse. Assume as well that an owner has surreptitiously switched a better 
horse for a poorer one, say, a $75,000 horse for a $50,000 one. Ordinarily, insiders would 
claim the horse, but difficulties arising from redocumenting a misdocumented horse would 
quite likely deter them from doing so. From this, Hall concludes that a relative dearth of 
claims may cause a track to investigate more closely. See id. at 275 (“To use a statistical 
analogy, the track looks at the residual of their estimation for the number of horses claimed 
in each race. Larger negative deviations signal increased probabilities of fraud.”). Hall goes 
on to argue that the threat of investigation, spurred by an absence of claims, itself acts to 
deter fraud. See id. 
8 See, e.g., Fattorusso v. Urbanowicz, 3 Misc. 3d 502, 504-05 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) 
(citations omitted) (“With the exception of the misrepresentation as to age or sex, the only 
other grounds for voiding a claim under the [New York] Racing and Wagering Board’s 
regulations is a positive test result for equine infectious anemia, a post-race blood or urine 
sample that tests positive for the use of unauthorized substances, or an unreported 
neuroectomy and an undisclosed pregnancy.”). 
9 Claiming races may also enable people to start a stable, or at least enter the 
business. See, e.g., Colm Greaves, More Claiming Races Could Be Cure To Reduction in 
Horse Ownership, IRISH EXAMINER (Jan. 9, 2016), 
www.irishexaminer.com/sport/racing/more-claiming-races-could-be-cure-to-reduction-in-
horse-ownership-375255.html (describing the push for more claiming races in Ireland and 
noting that claiming races create “liquidity … at the bottom end of a market that tends to 
be sluggish”). 
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predictably larger in one place than another. Assume, all other 
things being equal (e.g., the quality of the horses), that purses in 
State Y are predictably 20% higher than purses in State X. This 
may be attributable to State Y having a larger betting population 
or more wealth per capita than State X. Or it might be because 
purses in State Y are enhanced by a public subsidy, or by proceeds 
from casino gambling. Given the higher expected return per start 
in State Y, horses would, on the whole, be worth more there than 
in State X. This would create an incentive for entrepreneurs to 
buy horses in State X and take them to State Y, until the meets 
in State Y reached their capacity.10 This opportunity for arbitrage 
between tracks, coupled with the low transaction costs of claiming 
races, would present an attractive option for both claimants and 
owners.11 In fact, low transaction costs could cause many owners, 
particularly those who deal in small volumes, to rely heavily on 
claiming races to dispose of their inventory.12  
For some owners, however, a claiming race might simply 
substitute an undesirable “liability rule” for a preferred “property 
rule.”13 A comparison to eminent domain is apt. Assume my home 
has a fair market value of $250,000. You offer to buy it from me 
for that amount. Because a “property rule” ordinarily protects 
property, I may refuse your offer and insist on more—not because 
the market value of my property exceeds $250,000—by posit, it 
does not—but because my subjective value in the property exceeds 
that amount. If the government were to take my property by 
eminent domain, however, I could not hold out for my subjective 
price. Instead, assuming the government could show a “public 
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
10 In fact, the location of the larger purses could shift from time to time. This model 
does not require vectors to be permanent, but merely predictable enough to encourage 
arbitrage. 
11 See Neibergs & Vinzant, supra note 3, at 38 (noting that claiming races “provide 
a racehorse market which allows investors to purchase/liquidate racehorse investments 
….”). 
12 Although the Law of One Price would seem to suggest that a horse’s value would 
be the same everywhere, the logistical cost of moving a horse to another state and racing (or 
selling) it there could prove too high for many owners whose operations are limited in 
geographic scope or volume. Unlike a small-volume owner, an arbitrageur with operations 
in many states could enjoy economies of scale with respect to logistical costs. See generally 
Salem Rashid, The “Law” of One Price: Implausible Yet Consequential, 10 Q. J. AUSTRIAN 
ECON. 79, 84 (2007) (describing the challenges of arbitraging between two stores with 
different prices for rice).  
13 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972) (noting “three 
types of entitlements—entitlements protected by property rules, entitlements protected by 
liability rules, and inalienable entitlements”). 
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purpose” for the taking,14 a court would condemn my land and the 
government would be liable to me for its fair market value, which 
is $250,000. A “liability rule” would thus replace a “property rule.” 
A claiming race might operate similarly, albeit without quite the 
coercive aspect of eminent domain. If a track sets a claim price for 
a race at $50,000, and I enter my horse in that race, then you may 
buy my horse at that price, independent of whatever subjective 
value I may attach to it. I do retain the option of not entering my 
horse in a claiming race at all, but my horse would stand little 
chance of earning money if I withheld it from claiming races. 
As a strictly commercial matter, of course, rational 
owners would want to sell their horses at market price. To the 
extent commercial considerations control, they would not object 
to losing their horses in claiming races. On the other hand, 
commercial considerations might not control. More particularly, 
owners might prefer to keep their horses, if the subjective value 
they attach to them exceeds their market value. That is, they 
might prefer to “leave money on the table” in exchange for the 
utility of continuing to own a horse. The evidence is substantial 
that many people enter the horse industry not to make money, 
but as a hobby. For them, a sale at market price would not be 
ideal, because market price would not capture the subjective 
value they attach to their horses. 
We can thus see the dilemma that such owners face. They 
want to enter their horses in claiming races, because most races 
are claiming races, and the only way to win money in a claiming 
race is to enter it. But such races can trigger sales at something 
approximating market price. This puts them in a bind. If they 
try to preserve the subjective value of their horses by running 
them in races for which they are demonstrably underqualified, 
they will see inadequate return. If they seek return, however, by 
running their horses in races for which they are qualified, their 
horses may be claimed at something approximating market 
price, and they will lose their subjective value. 
Finally, for purposes of this paper, we can consider 
claiming races from tracks’ perspectives. Tracks want as many 
horses as possible at their meets. Specifically, they want 
relatively large fields, a large number of races per day, and they 
want horses to be sorted—one way or another—into fields of 
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
14 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005). 
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roughly even quality. For tracks, claiming races consequently 
present something of a double-edged sword: a seemingly effective 
and inexpensive way to ensure even fields, but also a device t h a t  
enables arbitrageurs to raid stables if purses are consistently 
larger somewhere else. 
Enter claiming jail, which appears to respond to—and 
thus confirm—this dynamic of arbitrage. Of the approximately 
thirty-eight states that allow parimutuel horse racing,15 
approximately twenty-seven impose this restriction.16 Under this 
rule, an individual who claims a horse is precluded from taking 
the horse to another track, or another state, for a certain period 
of time. Section (b) of Kentucky’s “Article 6,” for example, provides 
that: 
 
Unless the stewards grant permission for a claimed 
horse to enter and start at an overlapping or 
conflicting meeting in Kentucky, a horse shall not 
race elsewhere until the close of entries in the 
meeting at which it was claimed.17 
 
In other words, if a person claims a horse in Kentucky, he or she 
may not race it outside the Commonwealth for the duration of the 
meet at which the claim was made.  
We can fairly easily see how claiming jails would protect 
tracks from arbitrage, and, perhaps, owners who attach a high 
subjective value to their horses. By forbidding claimants to run a 
claimed horse outside a meet, rules like Article 6 tend to ensure 
that a track’s stables will remain full, regardless if the impetus 
to buy horses and take them elsewhere is strong. 
And, not surprisingly, tracks typically defend claiming jail 
in precisely these terms. In Jacobson v. Maryland Racing 
Commission,18 for example, a steward testified that, because of 
entrepreneurial activity, some of their very best Maryland breds 
were being claimed and that they were being raided, that these 
horses were going out of our state which, in effect, would have 
some economic impact on racing in Maryland, because we were 
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
15 See Jamgotchian v. Kentucky Horse Racing Commission, 488 S.W.3d 594, 599 
(Ky. 2014). 
16 See id. at 614 n.13.  
17 810 KY. ADMIN. REGS.1:015, §1(6)(b) (2007). 
18 Jacobson v. Maryland Racing Comm’n, 274 A.2d 102 (Md. 1971). 
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losing our better Maryland bred horses, and as you undoubtedly 
know … the handle [the amount of money bet daily on the races 
at a meet] will vary with the quality of the horses that are run at 
the race meeting.19 
Similarly, the president of Churchill Downs, in support of a 
more aggressive version of Article 6 in Kentucky, reportedly “cited 
the number of horses claimed at the Keeneland spring meet and 
the current Churchill meet that ran back at tracks outside 
Kentucky as examples of how the present claiming game restricts 
field sizes in the Bluegrass state.”20 “It’s hard for us to watch other 
states pass rules,” he said, “where they are guarding the horses in 
their state so people don’t go and claim them and run them in 
other places …. We’ve got to do something about it to assist the 
field sizes.”21 
Claiming jail may also protect owners’ subjective 
valuation of horses, to the extent it raises the opportunity cost of 
claiming a horse. If an entrepreneur claimed a horse at a track 
with meager purses, but had to run the horse at that track for 
the duration of the meet because of claiming jail, he or she would 
lose the additional expected return from larger purses 
elsewhere. At the margin, this would have a dampening effect on 
demand for horses in claiming races at that track, shifting the 
demand curve downward and to the left for would-be claimants.22 
This would provide some measure of protection to owners who do 
not want their horses claimed. Of course, this same dynamic 
would actually hurt owners who seek to liquidate their 
inventories in claiming races, by depressing demand.  
It would be difficult not to see interference with interstate 
commerce in the concept of claiming jail. A rule like Article 6 
draws a line (around the track, or at a state’s borders) and hoards 
a benefit (i.e., access to the claimed horse for the purpose of 
racing).23 
It is therefore identical in concept to innumerable 
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
19 Jacobson, 274 A.2d at 104-05 (brackets and ellipses original). 
20 Ron Mitchell, Draft Claiming, Scratch Rules Approved by Kentucky Authority, 
BLOODHORSE (June 19, 2007), https://www.bloodhorse.com/horse-
racing/articles/159457/draft-claiming-scratch-rules-approved-by-kentucky-authority. 
21 Id. (quoting Steve Sexton, president of Churchill Downs) (internal quotations 
removed). 
22 See GREGORY N. MANKVIEW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 71 (6th ed. 
2012) (“[M]arket demand depends on the number of … buyers.”). 
23 To put the matter in economic terms, claiming jail would depress the 
arbitrageurs’ function of re-allocating horses in proportion to purse size. 
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restrictions that courts have subjected to close scrutiny for their 
discriminatory treatment of interstate commerce. In fact, even if 
a state like Kentucky has a non-protectionist justification for a 
rule like Article 6, as Justice Stewart noted in Philadelphia v. 
New Jersey, “the evil of protectionism can reside in legislative 
means as well as legislative ends.”24 To exclude the possibility 
that a rule’s explicitly discriminatory means have been chosen 
to serve discriminatory ends, courts will typically ask whether it 
serves a legitimate (non-protectionist) purpose, and whether the 
state lacks a reasonable non-discriminatory alternative. 
 Upon examination, however, these rules seem to lack non-
protectionist rationales. Indeed, the evidence seems replete that 
states adopt them precisely to protect tracks from raiding (and 
perhaps some owners as well).25 To be sure, raiding appears to be 
an inevitable byproduct of: (1) claiming races, which are virtually 
unavoidable in parimutuel horse racing; and (2) substantial 
variations in purse sizes, which predictably arise from various 
economic, political, demographic, and geographic factors. But 
claiming races and claiming jail do not have to coexist. States are 
often mismatched in terms of natural or economic advantages, but 
the Supreme Court has largely, if not universally, rejected 
attempts by states to sequester their resources, in the interest of 
promoting a national economy. Thus, to defend rules like Article 6 
against attack, states need to explain the necessity of claiming jail, 
not claiming races. 
In a world without claiming jail, arbitrageurs quite likely 
would raid tracks with relatively small purses, until tracks with 
relatively large purses reached their fill of horses. At that point, 
the market would find a new equilibrium. The best horses would 
be allocated to the best purses, and so on, down the line. The 
demand curve for horses in claiming races at tracks with 
relatively small purses would shift back upward and to the right, 
returning to where it would be in the absence of the added cost of 
claiming jail. As part of this new equilibrium, horses appropriate 
to the purses in any given state would race in that state. 
Arbitrage would continue, but only as a function of economies of 
scale.26 The market would work, and the Balkanization would 
end.  
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
24 Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626 (1978) (emphasis added). 
25 See generally supra notes 18-21(including the accompanying text). 
26 See supra note 12. 
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It is an interesting question, however, as to whether tracks 
would adopt claiming jail on their own—that is, make it a 
condition of running horses there.27 Purely private policies would 
not implicate the Commerce Clause. If owners on the whole 
wanted to sell their horses in claiming races, they would try to 
avoid tracks with claiming jail, to avoid any distortions to the 
demand curve that it might cause. Tracks might defend their 
policy on the ground that they should be compensated, through 
the device of claiming jail, for facilitating sales with low 
transaction costs. In response, owners might argue that they do 
compensate tracks for performing this service, by bringing their 
horses to the track to race. 
Notwithstanding claiming jail’s fairly obvious interference 
with interstate commerce, attacks on the device have had mixed 
success in the courts. In Jamgotchian v. Kentucky Horse Racing 
Commission,28 for example, the Supreme Court of Kentucky 
upheld Kentucky’s version of claiming jail against constitutional 
attack, classifying Article 6 as “not protectionist in intent,”29 and 
declining to decouple claiming races from claiming jail. In other 
words, the Court insisted that protecting tracks from the 
vulnerability that claiming races create cannot practically be 
separated from claiming races themselves. As Justice Hughes 
wrote for a unanimous Court: 
 
[T]he Commission has compelling reasons—racing 
integrity reasons, if you will—that have nothing to 
do with Kentucky tracks’ competition with out-of-
state businesses for adopting some form of claiming 
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
27 In California, which currently does not have a public version of claiming jail, at 
least one track is reported to have a private one. See Jeremy Balan, CHRB Discusses ‘Jail-
Time’ Claiming Rule Change, BLOODHORSE (July 20, 2017) 
https://www.bloodhorse.com/horse-racing/articles/222671/chrb-discusses-jail-time-claiming- 
rule-change (“Del Mar has a house rule (45-day wait period or the end of the meet), and 
Santa Anita racing secretary Rick Hammerle said the Arcadia track will work to install a 
similar house rule for its fall meet to keep the circuit’s rules consistent .”). Nevertheless, the 
California Horse Racing Board (CHRB) appears to support a public rule. See id. (quoting 
CHRB spokesman Mike Marten) (“‘A house rule can take action (with) stabling privileges 
when they come around again, but … there is much greater authority in a (CHRB) rule than 
a house rule,’ Marten said. ‘It has a longer reach than a house rule.’”). 
28 Jamgotchian v. Kentucky Horse Racing Comm’n, 488 S.W.3d 594 (Ky. 2014). 
29 Id. at 615; see also id. at 605 n.7 (describing “Article 6’s ‘discrimination’ against 
out- of-state racetracks” as “more apparent than real”); id. at 610 (“Notwithstanding a 
modicum of discrimination, Article 6 is part of a larger, non-discriminatory racing 
regulation, not a trade regulation ….”). 
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rule that balances the risks/rewards to owners and 
potential purchasers, and thus has independent 
reason for as efficient a rule as experience with it 
can devise.30 
 
As suggested above, this horse quite likely will not run. 
The majority of parimutuel horse races must likely be claiming 
races, but claiming jail simply protects tracks—and perhaps 
some owners—from the threat of competition from tracks with 
larger purses elsewhere. Such an economic discrepancy can no 
more justify claiming jail than a state’s advantage in producing 
a commodity at low cost can justify a tariff against that state’s 
products.31 
In support of its approach, the Supreme Court of 
Kentucky differentiated, or attempted to differentiate, between 
two types of claimants: (1) those who merely want to serve as a 
monitor on opportunistic behavior; and (2) those who want to 
augment their inventory.32 “The claiming rule’s overbreadth,” 
wrote Justice Hughes, “means that the claiming rule itself is 
subject to ‘abuse’ by claimants who take advantage of it to claim 
not just patently and inappropriately valued horses, but other 
horses as well.”33 
One might, perhaps, illustrate this point as follows. 
Imagine that a $50,000 horse ran in a $40,000 claiming race, and 
someone claimed it. That claim, according to Justice Hughes, 
would not be “abusive,” because the horse was in fact worth more 
than the claim price. Now imagine that a $40,000 horse ran in 
the same race, and someone claimed it. According to Justice 
Hughes, that claim would be “abusive,” even if that same horse 
would be worth $50,000 in a state with larger purses. 
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
30 Jamgotchian, 488 S.W.3d at 615. For an opinion upholding Pennsylvania’s 
claiming jail against constitutional attack, see Jamgotchian v. State Horse Racing Comm’n, 
269 F.Supp.3d 604, 616 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (applying the test of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 
U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (“The burden on commerce, if any, is incidental and reasonably 
restrained to benefit the local horse racing industry.”)). The Pike test is ordinarily reserved 
for laws that do not discriminate against interstate commerce, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 461 (5th ed. 2015), and would therefore 
seem inappropriate as a test for claiming jail. Cf. Jacobson v. Maryland Racing 
Commission, 274 A.2d 102, 107 (Md. 1971) (upholding Maryland’s claiming jail against 
attack on grounds that it violated due process). 
31 See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935); West Lynn Creamery, 
Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994). 
32See Jamgotchian, 488 S.W.3d at 613. 
33 Id. 
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Justice Hughes’ argument has strong intuitive appeal, 
but it suffers from two significant flaws. First, it does not so 
much disprove protectionism as identify the class of individuals 
against whom the rule is intended to operate. Second, and 
perhaps more fundamentally, it assumes that an inherently 
mercenary device like claiming races will operate effectively if 
mercenary motives are muted. Analysis would appear to suggest, 
however, that the device would work less well to the extent 
demand were artificially suppressed.  
Although the Supreme Court of the United States denied 
review in Jamgotchian v. Kentucky Horse Racing Commission, 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Indiana recently struck down Indiana’s version of claiming jail 
in another action brought by the same individual.34 
The court’s analysis on the question of interference with 
interstate commerce was brief, but nevertheless emphatic: 
 
Applying the strict scrutiny standard, the 
Defendants have not shown that [Indiana’s claiming 
jail] advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot 
adequately be served by reasonable 
nondiscriminatory alternatives. Rather, they 
evince the type of economic protectionism that the 
dormant Commerce Clause is designed to prevent.35 
 
If Indiana appeals this decision, we should see this issue in the 
Seventh Circuit before long.36 
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
34 See Jamgotchian v. Indiana Horse Racing Comm’n, No. 1:16-cv-2344-WTL-TAB, 
slip op. at 7 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 20, 2017). Query whether the non-existence of claiming jail in 
Indiana (at least for now) will encourage owners in Kentucky to enter their horses in 
claiming races there, instead of in Kentucky, which retains claiming jail (at least for now). 
As noted earlier, if owners on the whole wanted to sell their horses in claiming races, they 
would try to avoid tracks with claiming jail. 
35 Id., slip op. at 6-7. 
36 In 2003, the Attorney General of California rendered an opinion that tends to 
suggest that claiming jail violates the federal Constitution. See Letter from Bill Lockyer to 
Roy C. Wood, Jr., Executive Director of the California Horse Racing Board (Sept. 8, 2003). 
Although California subsequently withdrew its claiming jail rules, it appears to be 
contemplating their reinstatement. See Balan, supra note 27. 
